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 THE PUNJAB ELECTIONS 1992
 Breakthrough or Breakdown.?
 Gurharpal Singh
 Few recent state elections in India have had as much
 significance as the Punjab poll in February 1992. Punjab has been wracked
 by ethnic violence that has claimed over 18,000 lives since 1984, and has
 witnessed the rise of a powerful separatist movement for an independent
 Sikh state. The province had been under President's Rule since May 1987,
 and therefore the decision to hold elections was generally welcomed as an
 opportunity to unlock the intractable "Punjab problem" that had bedev-
 iled successive Indian governments. In the event, however, the elections
 failed to provide a critical turning point, and their outcome seemed more
 likely to precipitate a political breakdown than a breakthrough. This arti-
 cle attempts to explain why the elections produced this outcome and why
 the policy initiatives undertaken by the new Congress-I government have
 been so unsuccessful. And in light of these developments, it analyzes pros-
 pects for the future.
 The Background
 No serious appreciation of the context in which the February poll was held
 is possible without an understanding of the post-1984 developments in
 Punjab. Although these have been covered at length elsewhere,' a brief
 summary is required here. After the fallout from Operation Blue Star in
 1984 (the military action against the extremist Sikh faction), the Congress-
 I under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi adopted a political strategy designed
 to solve the "Punjab Problem." The cornerstone of this strategy was the
 Rajiv-Longowal Accord, which appeared to meet most of the constitu-
 ... . . Gurharpal Singh is Senior Lecturer in Politics, School of Arts, De
 Montfort University, Leicester, England. The author is grateful to the Nuffield Foundation
 for its financial support of research on which this article is based.
 ? 1992 by The Regents of the University of California
 1. Gurharpal Singh, "The Punjab Problem in the 1990s: A Post-1984 Assessment," Jour-
 nal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 29:2 (July 1991), pp. 175-91.
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 tional, territorial, economic, and religious demands of the Akali Dal, the
 main Sikh political party that had led the pre-1984 agitation.2 The Accord
 was accompanied by state assembly elections in September 1985 that saw
 the overwhelming electoral success of a moderate Akali Dal (L) ministry.
 Non-Sikh specialists are regularly bewildered by the extreme factional
 complexity of Sikh politics. Excluding the Congress-I, the two Commu-
 nist parties, and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), four types of Sikh polit-
 ical leadership since 1984 can be identified and can be distinguished by
 chronology, tactics, and strategy toward the pursuit of Sikh demands rang-
 ing from regional autonomy within the Indian Union to a separate Sikh
 state. These parties are:
 1. The moderates: Akali Dal (Badal), Akali Dal (Longowal), Akali Dal
 (Kabul), and Akali Dal (Panthic), who supported-enthusiastically or re-
 luctantly-the Rajiv-Longowal Accord and represent the traditional pre-
 1984 Sikh leadership with their commitment to parliamentarism and the
 Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR-see n. 2).
 2. The radicals: Akali Dal (Mann) and Akali Dal (Baba), who displaced
 the moderates in the 1989 Lok Sabha election and who accept the ASR but
 emphasize its stress on the Sikh right to self-determination.
 3. The democratic militants: All-India Sikh Student Federation (Man-
 jit), Damdami Taksal, Panthic Committee (Manochahal), Khalistan Com-
 mando Force, Bindranwala Tiger Force, and the Dashmesh Regiment,
 who espouse a twin strategy of parliamentarism and armed struggle for a
 separate state of Khalistan.
 4. The armed militants: Panthic Committee (Dr. Sohan Singh), Khali-
 stan Liberation Force, Babbar Khalsa International, and Akali Dal (Bab-
 bar), who have consistently pursued the armed struggle for Khalistan and
 have condemned the use of parliamentarism even as a tactic.
 Although the alignments between and within these groups are in constant
 flux, especially with the armed groups, the four types provide a useful clas-
 sification. It must be emphasized that the above types are not designations
 used by the groups themselves but merely tentative suggestions for a new
 typology of Sikh politics.
 2. See ibid. for details of the Accord and its implementation up to 1989. The main points
 concerned the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab, settlement of the Ravi-Beas water dispute
 with Harayana and Rajasthan, prosecution of 1984 anti-Sikh rioters, rehabilitation of 1984
 Sikh army deserters, release of political detainees, enactment of an all-India Gurdwaras Act,
 and an evaluation of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR) calling for the Indian govern-
 ment's powers to be restricted to defense, currency, communications, and international af-
 fairs.
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 Despite its electoral victory, the moderate Akali Dal (L) administration
 was short-lived, undermined both by the growth of the Sikh militant orga-
 nizations who challenged the constitutional path and advocated an armed
 struggle for a separate state and by the reluctance of the Indian govern-
 ment to implement major provisions of the Accord. The imposition of
 President's Rule in May 1987 marked the beginning of direct rule from
 New Delhi that lasted until February 1992. The defeat of the Congress-I
 government in 1989 and the success of the V. P. Singh-led National Front
 coalition signaled a new phase in the efforts to resolve the "Punjab Prob-
 lem." Although the National Front leadership held the previous adminis-
 tration responsible for the deterioration of ethnic conflict in Punjab, its
 "value based" approach was compromised by the fear that elections in the
 state might create a "Latvian scenario" in which the separatist movement
 would accrue support. This possibility had been heightened by the results
 of the 1989 election for Punjab's 13 Lok Sabha (lower house) seats that led
 to the emergence and victory of a radical-militant Sikh leadership demand-
 ing the right of "self-determination for the Sikhs." The National Front's
 reluctant response to these demands was to extend two periods of Presi-
 dent's Rule, despite its strong reservations.
 The collapse of the National Front coalition and its replacement by a
 minority Janata (S) government was followed by renewed efforts at a nego-
 tiated solution. Chandra Shekhar, the new prime minister, first sent in the
 army to contain militant violence and then opened talks with the radical
 Sikh leadership. When the latter proved vacillating, he made a direct ap-
 proach to smaller militant groups (the democratic militants). These talks
 culminated in a secret deal in which Shekhar, following the announcement
 of national elections in March 1991, authorized a notification for state as-
 sembly and parliamentary polls in Punjab.3 The democratic militant
 groups, for their part, agreed not to turn the elections into a "referendum
 on Khalistan" but use them as a means to marginalize the radicals and the
 armed militants.
 Rajiv Gandhi's response to these maneuvers was to condemn the
 Shekhar-democratic militant deal and promise to revoke the elections if his
 party was successful in obtaining a majority at the center. As the cam-
 paign progressed, the armed militants called for a boycott, while in the
 absence of Congress-I, the other Sikh leadership groups-democratic mili-
 tants, radicals and moderates-competed with each other. Toward the
 end of the campaign, the level of violence escalated dramatically: 24 state
 and parliamentary candidates were killed; 76 passengers on two trains
 were massacred; and a week before polling, Punjab was declared a dis-
 3. Indian Express (Bombay), 28 April 1991.
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 turbed area. Yet, despite these setbacks, the state administration expressed
 an unusual determination to hold the elections on June 22, 1991. How-
 ever, circumstances changed rapidly in the few days before polling as it
 became apparent that the Congress-I would form the new Indian govern-
 ment. On election eve, the Chief Election Commissioner, after talks with
 the new Congress-I leadership, postponed the Punjab poll until September
 25. Formally, he justified his action by insisting that the increased levels of
 violence compelled him to make this unprecedented decision; informally, it
 was generally assumed that "the Chief Election Commissioner had bent
 backwards to please his new masters."4
 The postponement had serious consequences. First, confidence in the
 state administration was shaken as Governor Malhotra resigned in protest.
 Second, Sikh leaders from all spectrums made common cause against the
 government's decision. At a meeting in Anandpur in early September,
 they decided to boycott any future poll on the grounds that the central
 government could not guarantee that it would be "free and fair." Third,
 the Congress-I administration found the new time frame for holding elec-
 tions to be inadequate. Constrained by the September 25 deadline, the
 impending expiration of President's Rule, and the Congress's minority sta-
 tus that depended on a shifting coalition of Left and Right parties in the
 Lok Sabha, the administration responded by revoking the election process
 in Punjab through an amendment to the Peoples Representation Act
 (1951) and further extending President's Rule, though with an undertak-
 ing that elections would be held by February 15, 1992. The government
 then took a number of measures to "pacify" Punjab. K. P. S. Gill, the
 former chief of police who had acquired the reputation of "governor-gen-
 eral" and had ruthlessly prosecuted the anti-terrorist campaign, was rein-
 stated despite opposition from the Punjab governor. In November nine
 divisions of the Indian army were sent to the state to contain militant ac-
 tivity and provide support for the elections. At the political level, the na-
 tional government launched an "all-party" discussion as a way of finding a
 "consensus" solution to the "Punjab Problem." This posture was accom-
 panied by strong suggestions that the outstanding provisions of the Rajiv-
 Longowal Accord would be implemented and that a new "package deal"
 for Punjab was being considered by a powerful cabinet subcommittee.
 However, as the election approached, the center's strategy seemed in-
 creasingly threatened. In mid-January armed militant, democratic mili-
 tant, radical, and the majority of moderate Sikh leaders reaffirmed their
 decision to boycott the elections. Their conditions for participation ranged
 from withdrawal of "military rule" to the involvement of the United Na-
 4. Indian Express, 23 June 1991.
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 tions in administering the poll. Although the minority (moderate Akali
 Dal [K]) decided to participate, last minute suggestions that the central
 government was about to announce a new package deal, to include the
 transfer of Chandigarh and settlement of the territorial and water disputes,
 were insufficient to entice the majority of moderates. Procrastination over
 the new package was only ended after formal announcement of the Sikh
 boycott, made when the election notification was issued.5
 The Election Campaign
 Notification for the February 1992 poll was issued on January 25. It was
 preceded by two presidential ordinances that reduced the period of
 campaigning from 21 to 14 days and revoked the provision for counter-
 manding an election in the event of the death of an independent candidate.
 These measures were taken to avoid a repetition of the June poll and to
 blunt the Sikh political leadership's plan to launch a countercampaign in
 support of the boycott. Indeed, to preempt the latter, political leaders of
 the six main Sikh organizations and several hundred party workers were
 detained under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act
 (1985).6 Their efforts to lead a "Kashmir style" march from Anandpur
 and a call for a band on polling day were forcefully repressed.
 Armed militants, on the other hand, conducted sporadic efforts to dis-
 rupt the election campaign. Warnings were issued against voting, and sev-
 eral campaigners-especially from the BJP-and electoral administrators
 were killed. But the violence did not reach the level of the previous June
 poll; there were no significant pre-poll massacres and no candidate was
 killed. This relative success was attributed mainly to the massive security
 operation by almost 250,000 army, paramilitary, and police personnel.
 Each candidate was provided with a 32-person security detachment, and
 for more prominent leaders, the figure was 50 or higher. This security
 cordon, combined with threats from armed militants, created an atmos-
 phere of heightened tension in which the candidates were often outnum-
 bered by security personnel when addressing election rallies. For the most
 part, the campaign was urban-centered and candidates avoided the rural
 constituencies.
 The programs of the political parties that did participate ranged from
 the BJP's more forceful stance against Sikh militancy and the Congress-I's
 promises to "pacify Punjab" to the Left parties-CPI and CPI (M)-advo-
 5. Sunday Times of India (New Delhi), 26 January 1992; Des Pardes (Punjabi weekly,
 Southall, UK), 7 February 1992.
 6. Sunday Times of India, 2 February 1992.
 7. Tribune (Chandigarh), 4 December 1991.
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 cacy of an immediate implementation of the Rajiv-Longowal Accord. The
 Congress-I's national leadership abandoned its proposal for common can-
 didates following the Sikh leaders' announcement of the boycott, a deci-
 sion that led some parties to argue that the Congress-I was only interested
 in securing the state's 13 Lok Sabha (parliamentary) seats. This percep-
 tion was reinforced when the Congress-I decided to contest all of the state
 assembly and Lok Sabha seats. Seat adjustments occurred but this took
 place mainly between minor parties such as Janata Dal, Akali Dal (K),
 CPI and CPI (M). The BJP, abandoned by the Congress and the small
 parties, conducted a relatively low-key campaign despite the fact that its
 "unity march" coincided with the beginning of the elections.8
 Several smaller parties and independents complained of bureaucratic
 and security intimidation. Captain Amrinder Singh, leader of the Akali
 Dal (K), alleged that three of his candidates were detained to prevent them
 from filing their candidacies. A breakaway faction from the Akali Dal
 (Badal), which had decided to participate in the elections, quickly changed
 its mind when its candidates could not file their papers. In fact, the total
 number of candidates for assembly seats was the lowest since 1972, with an
 average of only five candidates per seat. Several reported cases of ballot
 rigging on polling day were confirmed by independent observers. The
 armed militants' call for a total boycott was occasionally countered, espe-
 cially in front-line villages, by enforced participation by security forces.
 Overall, however, where polling did take place, it was largely peaceful, but
 it was subdued compared to the normal exuberant standards of Indian
 electioneering.
 The Result
 The result belied the confident expectations of the Indian government and
 the Punjab administration of a 30-40% voter turnout. The actual figures
 were 24.3% and 21.5% for the state and parliamentary elections, respec-
 tively. Worringly, the turnout was lower than critical assembly elections
 held in relatively similar circumstances in the two problem states of Kash-
 mir (31.6% in 1987) and Assam (32.6% in 1983) and significantly less
 than the normal Punjab average of 68.2% (1966-85).
 Nevertheless, the Congress-I made a near clean sweep of the assembly
 and parliamentary seats, gaining 87 and 12, respectively. The expected
 challenge to the Congress from the BJP and the Akali Dal (K) did not
 materialize. The latter performed dismally while the former made only a
 marginal improvement in seats from its 1985 showing. In fact, the BJP
 support in urban areas appears to have shifted to the Congress-I, which
 8. Sunday Times of India, 9 February 1992.
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 TABLE 1 Punjab Elections, 1992
 State Assembly Lok Sabha
 (Turnout = 24.3%) (Turnout = 21.5%)
 Party* Seats Vote Polled Seats Vote Polled
 Congress (I) 87 43.8 12 50.8
 Bahujan Samaj Party 9 16.2 1 18.6
 Bhartiya Janata Party 6 16.6 16.5
 Communist Party of India 4 3.4 1.7
 Akali Dal (Kabul) 3 5.2 2.8
 Communist Party of India (M) 1 2.7 3.4
 Janata Dal 1 2.1 1.9
 Independents 6 9.6 3.4
 Total 117 100 13 100
 SOURCE: India Abroad, 28 February 1992.
 *Lok Dal and the Samajwadi Janata Party, whose combined vote was 0.03%, have been
 excluded.
 gained over 50% of the vote in the major cities of Amritsar, Jalandhar,
 Gurdaspur, and Ludhiana. The two Communist parties also failed to capi-
 talize on the Akali boycott in the rural areas. But perhaps the main sur-
 prise in the poll was the strong performance of the BSP, which became the
 main opposition party in the new assembly and secured one seat in the Lok
 Sabha. Appealing to Scheduled and lower caste voters, it did exceptionally
 well in the Doaba area (Jalandhar, Kapurthala, and Hoshiarpur districts)
 and the district of Faridkot.
 The voter turnout was not only extremely low but was unevenly spread.
 Only in three districts (Firozpur, Jalandhar, and Hoshiarpur) did it exceed
 30%, and this was partly attributable to urbanization (Jalandhar), the lo-
 cal strength of non-Sikh parties (Firozpur), and a high non-Sikh popula-
 tion (Hoshiarpur). Voting was especially low in rural Sikh majority areas
 that constitute 70 of the total 117 assembly seats, averaging 15. 1% in these
 constituencies. In recent years these areas have also seen the rise of armed
 militant activity and a strong enforcement of antiterrorist measures by po-
 lice and security forces. The rural constituencies set new records for low-
 est assembly polls. In Joga, which recorded a turnout of less than 1%, a
 Naxalite candidate was elected with 394 votes. The CPI (M)'s representa-
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 TABLE 2 District-Wise Turnout
 District % District %
 Firozpur 43.3 Patiala 22.9
 Hoshiarpur 36.9 Ropar 19.8
 Jalandhar 30.4 Ludhiana 16.6
 Kapurthala 25.8 Amritsar 16.1
 Gurdaspur 24.3 Bhatinda 13.9
 Faridkot 24.3 Sangrur 13.1
 TABLE 3 Urban-Rural Turnout 1992 (%)
 Number of Constituencies A verage Vote Polled
 Urban (12) 38.3
 Semi-Urban (11) 26.5
 Semi-Rural (24) 25.3
 Rural (70) 15.1
 SOURCE: India Today, 15 March 1992
 tive got only 1,849 votes. In 24 constituencies, the winning candidates
 each polled less than 5,000 votes and in two they were returned unop-
 posed. The pattern was not dissimilar in the parliamentary polls; in
 Hoshiarpur, the winning candidate was elected with only 15,627 votes, and
 two other Lok Sabha candidates polled less than 60,000 votes.
 The turnout in urban areas, in contrast, was relatively high. Although it
 did not reach the levels of 1985 (57.7%), it averaged a respectable 38.3%
 in the 12 urban constituencies. This difference is mainly due to the con-
 centration in urban areas of the Punjab Hindu population-which turned
 out in large numbers-and the weakness of Sikh political parties in these
 constituencies. But in semiurban and semirural constituencies the figures
 were significantly lower, reflecting perhaps the possibility of dominant
 community pressure and fear of a backlash. In the main, the Congress-I
 did exceptionally well in the urban constituencies, and the accusation that
 its success rested entirely on the "Hindu vote" is perhaps an overstate-
 ment.
 Overall, the Punjab elections and the unusual context in which they
 were held have made three clear points. First, although the Congress-I
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 was remarkably successful in terms of assembly and parliamentary seats,
 this success is essentially fragile and is based on a very narrow support
 base. The aggregate number of state assembly votes for the party was only
 10% of the total electorate, and this support was heavily drawn from ur-
 ban areas with only nominal representation of the Sikh peasantry. Con-
 gress-I's claims to be a broad communal and class coalition have been
 further eroded by the rise of the BSP, which made substantial gains in its
 traditional support among the Scheduled and other backward castes and
 its appeal to the urban Hindu constituency of the Bharatiya Janata Party
 (BJP). To what extent the Congress-I vote was also a victim of the boycott
 remains a moot point. Assuming that one-third to one-half of Congress-I
 voters did not cast their votes, the election still confirms the Congress-I
 performance as weaker than in 1985.
 Second, the virtual nonrepresentation of the majority religious (Sikh)
 and social (peasantry) community has cast a shadow over the viability of
 the election results. Clearly, the Congress-I has "won the battle for the
 state legislature but it has lost the war for Sikh hearts."9 Even allowing for
 the factor of intimidation, which certainly deterred many voters, it is likely
 that the impressive boycott was also an expression of disapproval of Presi-
 dent's Rule and the Indian government's policies. Taking into account the
 boycott, the level of mobilization in the June poll, and the results of the
 1989 Lok Sabha elections, it is more than reasonable to suggest that the
 Sikh political parties, united or factionalized, would have defeated the
 Congress-I. Their decision not to participate, therefore, was a landmark
 development indicative not only of denial of self-interest but a recognition
 that simple elections will not restart the political process in Punjab.
 Third, the conduct of the elections and the circumstances in which they
 were undertaken undermined one of the strategic cards the central govern-
 ment had in disentangling the "Punjab Problem." After 1984, the idea of
 state assembly elections was largely geared to the belief that elections
 should legitimize and restore the democratic process after a comprehensive
 agreement on Sikh demands according to the Rajiv-Longowal Accord.
 For pragmatic interests, the Chandra Shekhar ministry subverted this
 logic, and the February election merely continued the process. By holding
 elections, the central government has both demonstrated its commitment
 to constitutional propriety and has shown that such a commitment, whew
 it intersects with party interests, is worth maintaining even at the cost of a
 serious erosion of democratic legitimacy. Ironically, such a commitment
 was quickly jettisoned in the decision to postpone the election set for June
 1991.
 9. India Today (New Delhi), 15 March 1992.
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 Prospects for the Future
 The formation of the first Congress ministry in Punjab after nine years is
 unlikely to provide a lasting solution to the "Punjab Problem." The party
 leaders who boycotted the 1992 election and their supporters intensified
 their campaign to oust what they call a "puppet administration." Despite
 the new chief minister's promise to "pacify" Punjab and rule for five years,
 his immediate concern-like that of the President's Rule regime-was to
 contain the rising tide of violence. Less than two weeks after the elections,
 he narrowly escaped an assassination attempt. Armed militants also in-
 creased their attacks on military and civilian targets with an alarming in-
 crease in the daily death rate. In March the industrial district of Ludhiana
 came to a virtual standstill and was placed under direct army rule along-
 side the adjoining Sangrur District. These instances of the potentially ex-
 plosive situation in the state led to repeated assertions by the Indian and
 Punjab governments that the army will remain in Punjab as long as it is
 required. Nor was it likely that the Congress-I ministry could improve its
 legitimacy rating by championing the outstanding territorial and economic
 demands vis-A-vis Harayana or appealing to rural populism. For most of
 the Sikh leadership and the community, the Rajiv-Longowal Accord had
 become essentially a non-issue; moreover, the Congress-I government in
 Harayana, led by the intransigent Bhajan Lal, has sustained its opposition
 to the Accord. Opportunities for rural populism are severely limited by
 the fiscal crisis in the state, and the development program announced by
 the new ministry in its budgetary sessions made few concessions to the
 rural sector. 10
 The prospect of what one former governor called "an open rebellion" in
 Punjab revived speculation in New Delhi of a new "package-deal."11 Such
 a deal, if it included a resolution of the territorial and economic demands,
 might provide more ballast to Congress-I state government but would in-
 evitably invite criticism as to why it was not announced prior to the elec-
 tions when it could have induced the majority of Sikh moderates to
 participate. Further, the legitimacy value from such a package would be
 considerably diminished if the Indian government were unwilling to call
 fresh elections, and it is unlikely to contemplate such a possibility given
 the political and military investment in the February poll.
 Indeed the likelihood of a new election seemed increasingly improbable
 as the boycott, and the weak performance of the Akali Dal (K), strength-
 ened the position of the Sikh armed militants, democratic militants, and
 the radicals. Parliamentarism, the essential lubricant that had sustained
 10. Des Pardes, 10 April 1992.
 1 1. Ibid.
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 the moderates, was dealt a blow by the postponement and subsequent can-
 cellation of the June 1991 poll and the "khaki election" of February 1992.
 Moderate leaders were compelled to follow the logic of the militants and
 issued a joint declaration on March 18 from Anandpur calling for a "sov-
 ereign Sikh state." Some radical and democratic militants conceded that
 the armed militants' goal and strategy had proved correct. On April 13,
 1992 (Basakhi Sikh new year), an open call was made for the creation of a
 sovereign state of Khalistan. While factional differences among Sikh lead-
 ers will always create a potential for central governments to seek a resolu-
 tion of the "Punjab Problem" by accentuating the disjunction between
 ethnic demands and the desire of Sikh leaders for political power, the
 above developments and the violent response to the new Congress state
 administration suggested that even the most accomplished Sikh leadership
 would find it difficult to reconcile the goal of Sikh self-determination
 within the framework of the Indian Union.
 However, as the year has progressed, the Congress ministry has been
 bolstered by the increasing effectiveness of the security forces against the
 militants-a number of leading militants have been eliminated-and its
 impressive showing in the municipal elections in September 1992 where it
 won more than half of the seats. Moreover, although many moderate and
 radical Sikh leaders have been detained and restricted from mobilizing
 support, there is a growing realization among them that perhaps the Feb-
 ruary election boycott was a mistake.12 This new realism and the unex-
 pected survival of the Congress-I administration provides a potential space
 for maneuver, but whether it will be utilized remains highly unlikely. The
 factionalized Sikh political leadership-moderate to militant-while it
 rues the missed opportunity for political power at the state level, seems
 locked in the rhetoric of self-determination. At the same time, the
 "achievements" of the Congress-I government in containing militancy
 have endeared it to a central government beleaguered by a succession of
 crises-financial scandal, the Ayodhya temple/mosque conflict, internal
 dissension within the Congress-I, and others. Against this background,
 the urgency to find a dramatic solution to the "Punjab Problem" has re-
 ceded. Hence, while the possibility of an imminent breakdown of political
 order has clearly been arrested, the opportunity for a major breakthrough
 has once more been missed.
 In retrospect, the 1992 Punjab elections will probably be seen as mark-
 ing a watershed in the post-1984 "Punjab Problem," when the main Sikh
 political leadership decided to forgo its faith in parliamentarism and pur-
 sue the goal of an independent Sikh state. The road from the Rajiv-
 12. Author's interviews, July-August 1992, in Punjab.
This content downloaded from 195.195.176.5 on Fri, 21 Jun 2019 12:34:57 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 GURHARPAL SINGH 999
 Longowal Accord to 1992 has been painful, reluctant, and hesitant. As
 Indian governments have vacillated or sought to impose their will, the
 main Sikh leadership has gradually edged, often unwillingly at the prompt-
 ing of armed militants, from claims to regional autonomy under the
 Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1985-89) to Sikh self-determination (1990-
 91). In contrast, Indian Union governments have popularized the view
 that Punjab is increasingly ungovernable and that the purpose of elections,
 if they have to be held, is essentially to fulfill a constitutional obligation.
 The policies of the present Rao Congress-I government were certainly
 carefully calculated to meet a constitutional commitment after the debacle
 of June 1991 and to prepare for the contingency of ungovernability.13 It
 remains to be seen whether 1992 will rank with 1986, 1987, 1990, and 1991
 as another missed opportunity for a comprehensive settlement of the
 "Punjab Problem."
 13. Tribune, 13 December 1991.
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